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Abstract
In a two-country model where ￿rms behave ￿ la Cournot, we show that marginal and non-marginal
trade liberalization have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the social desirability of horizontal mergers. Marginal
tari⁄ reductions increase (decrease) the desirability of merger at su¢ ciently low (high) tari⁄ levels.
In the neighborhood of free trade, for su¢ ciently low cost savings from merger, trade liberalization
increases the desirability of merger whilst decreasing the pro￿tability, implying that mergers should
be actively encouraged by competition authorities. Furthermore, we identify ranges of tari⁄levels for
which, if trade liberalization increases (decreases) the desirability of merger, it necessarily increases
(decreases) its pro￿tability.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: L41, F13
Keywords: Horizontal merger, trade liberalization, antitrust policy
1 Introduction
During the past two decades, the world has been gradually moving closer to free trade. In North
America, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (1989) has been closely followed by NAFTA (1994).
In Europe, the move towards free trade has been a necessary step towards closer economic integration.
Tari⁄ levels across many countries and sectors have been on the decline. For example, average
Canadian tari⁄s on manufactured goods fell from 10% to 2.3% between 1988 and 1997 (Baggs
(2005)). At the same time, mergers between ￿rms have been on the rise. During the period 1980-99,
worldwide mergers grew at a rate of 42% (World Investment Report 2000, UNCTAD). The merger
wave of the late 1980￿ s was followed by another ￿ve times larger in volume during the late 1990￿ s. In
2006, merger volumes grew to an unprecented level with the total value of merger activity surpassing
1$1.3 trillion (The Economist, January 2007). About 70% of all mergers are domestic, that is, mergers
between di⁄erent ￿rms within the same country (Brakman, Garresten and Marrewijk (2005)).
Several explanations have been o⁄ered for the growth in the volume of merger activity in recent
years. Qiu and Zhou (2006) attribute the rising number of mergers world-wide to the information
asymmetry about domestic demand that exists between domestic and foreign ￿rms. Bjorvatn (2004)
attributes this to closer economic integration of markets. Although not the only contender, trade lib-
eralization remains one of the most-studied factors a⁄ecting ￿rms￿incentives to merge. There exist a
few studies which investigate whether trade liberalization actively encourages mergers (Benchekroun
and Ray Chaudhuri (2006), Falvey (2005), Faria and Yildiz (2005), Gaudet and Kanouni (2004),
Horn and Persson (2001), Long and Vousden (1995), Ross (1988), Yildiz (2003)).
International organizations, including the WTO, the IMF and the OECD, have also been con-
cerned with the interaction of competition policy and trade policy in recent years. One of the
rising concerns is that, as trade liberalization undermines the use of trade policy as a strategic tool,
countries use competition policy strategically to improve their own welfare at the expense of others.
There exist a few studies which allow countries to use competition policy strategically and examine
how the optimal number of ￿rms responds to trade liberalization (Horn and Levinsohn (2001), De
Stefano and Rysman (2004) and Richardson (1999)). On the other hand, Collie (2003) and Saggi
and Yildiz (2006) present the e⁄ect of mergers on a country￿ s optimal trade policy.
We focus on the impact of horizontal domestic mergers on social welfare. We say that a tari⁄
reduction increases (decreases) the desirability of a merger when it increases (decreases) the merger-
induced change in social welfare. We address two important questions: (i) Does trade liberalization
render a domestic horizontal merger more desirable to society? (ii) Does trade liberalization move
desirability and pro￿tability in the same direction? In addressing these issues we simultaneously
address some other interesting questions that arise: Who are the winners and the losers from such
2mergers in the face of trade liberalization? What are the implications of trade liberalization for
domestic competition policy?
We consider two countries, Home and Foreign, with segmented markets and identical demand
conditions. We focus on the case where both countries have the same number of ￿rms. All ￿rms are
assumed to produce a homogeneous good and compete ￿ la Cournot. A "Home ￿rm" is a ￿rm that
undertakes production in Home, and a "Foreign ￿rm" is one that undertakes production in Foreign.
All ￿rms are allowed to sell their output locally and to export.
We focus on the merger of two Home ￿rms with di⁄erent production technologies. Subsequent to
the merger, the merged entity is assumed to have access to the more e¢ cient of the two technologies.
This scenario re￿ ects two of the most commonly cited reasons for ￿rms to participate in merger
activity. First, the merger participants can gain market power subsequent to the merger. Second,
there are cost savings from the merger, since by participating in the merger, one of the merger
participants gains access to cheaper technology. We vary the level of merger-induced cost savings in
order to distinguish between two main types of mergers: those with high cost savings that lead to
greater productive e¢ ciency and those with low cost savings that lead mainly to increased market
power of the merger participants. We then investigate the impact of trade liberalization on each
type of merger.
Trade liberalization, in this model, takes the form of equal bilateral tari⁄ reductions. This
re￿ ects the situation subsequent to rounds of international negotiations. For example, when the
NAFTA was signed in 1994, it was mandated that tari⁄s in North America be gradually phased
out over a period of 14 years. Trade liberalization following free trade agreements often occurs as
piecemeal tari⁄ reductions, as in the above example. We, therefore, present a global analysis for all
positive tari⁄ levels, rather than restricting the analysis to either the neighborhood of free trade or
of the optimal tari⁄ level, which has been the case in the previously mentioned studies on strategic
3competition policy.1
Now let us turn to a discussion of our main results. In addressing our ￿rst question of interest,
we ￿nd that the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the desirability of merger is crucially dependent
on the tari⁄ level prior to liberalization. The desirability of a merger is de￿ned to be the merger-
induced change in social welfare. This is shown to be convex and non-monotonic in the tari⁄ level,
which explains why our results vary with the pre-liberalization tari⁄ level. In the neighborhood of
free trade, marginal trade liberalization is shown to increase the desirability of merger, whereas at
su¢ ciently high tari⁄ levels, desirability of merger falls in response to marginal trade liberalization.
Thus, the conclusions around a strictly positive tari⁄ level and in the neighborhood of free trade
may give con￿ icting recommendations on how to adjust competition policy following a marginal
tari⁄ reduction. Moreover, the impact of marginal trade liberalization, at any given tari⁄ level, can
fail to accurately predict the change in the desirability of merger in response to tari⁄ reductions
which are non-marginal. Thus, we show that relying on marginal analyses to ascertain the response
of merger policy to trade liberalization can lead to detrimental policy changes. It is essential to
take into consideration the exact pre- and post-liberalization tari⁄ levels in order to obtain accurate
policy prescriptions.
In order to determine the conditions under which competition policy should actively encourage
or disallow a merger in the face of trade liberalization, it is not su¢ cient to focus solely on the
desirability of merger. We must silmultaneously determine the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the
pro￿tability of the merger. This brings us to the second important question addressed by this paper.
Does trade liberalization move the social and private responses to a potential merger in the same
direction?
In the neighborhoods of free trade and the prohibitive tari⁄, for su¢ ciently low cost savings from
1Exceptions include Gaudet and Kanouni (2004) who focus on the e⁄ect of moving from a prohibitive to a non-
prohibitive tari⁄ on the pro￿tability of merger.
4merger, desirability and pro￿tability of merger are shown to move in opposite directions in response
to trade liberalization, whereas for intermediate levels of tari⁄ they move in the same direction.
Interestingly, we show that in the neighborhood of free trade, for su¢ ciently low cost savings from
merger, trade liberalization increases the desirability of merger whilst decreasing the pro￿tability.
Thus, under these conditions, competition policy is needed to actively encourage the realization of
potential mergers.
We are also able to obtain the following results independent of the level of cost savings from
merger. This analysis is useful because in reality tari⁄ changes are transparent but cost savings
from merger are not. Competition bureaus can, at best, estimate the latter. We show that at tari⁄
levels below a certain threshold, if desirability of merger falls in response to trade liberalization
so must pro￿tability, whereas at tari⁄ levels above a certain threshold, if desirability rises so must
the merger￿ s pro￿tability. Thus, regardless of the level of cost savings from merger, when the pre-
liberalization tari⁄ level lies within either of these ranges, the need to actively use merger policy in
response to trade liberalization to encourage or prevent mergers is reduced. If the merger becomes
more (less) desirable, it is naturally more (less) likely to be realized.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 derives the change in welfare
due to the merger for any given tari⁄ level. Section 4 discusses the impact of trade liberalization on
the desirability of merger. Section 5 derives the conditions under which trade liberalization increases
both pro￿tability and desirability of merger and those under which one is increased at the expense
of the other. Section 6 presents the concluding remarks.
2 The Model and Preliminaries
We consider a scenario with two countries, Home and Foreign, with segmented markets. All ￿rms
produce a homogenous product. To explain the realization of mergers amongst ￿rms within an
5industry, the industrial organization literature has identi￿ed two main factors, both of which have
been shown to be empirically relevant and both of which are incorporated in our model: (i) ￿rms
merge in order to gain market power (ii) ￿rms merge in order to bene￿t from a resulting reduction in
their cost of production. The latter can arise due to the existence of economies of scale in the ￿rms￿
production function or if the merger results in the shutting down of one of the plants leading to
￿xed cost savings. Thereby, the merged entity would enjoy a lower average cost of production than
either of the merger participants prior to the merger. Alternatively, it is possible that the merger
participants vary in their productive e¢ ciency and that the merger is motivated by the fact that
the high cost ￿rm wishes to gain access to the low cost ￿rm￿ s technology. Our model incorporates
this latter feature by allowing the merger participants to have heterogenous cost structures. Home
has n + 2 ￿rms where n ￿rms are identical with marginal cost c. Firm 1 and ￿rm 2 in Home, the
merger participants, have di⁄erent marginal costs, c1 and c2 respectively (at least one di⁄erent from
c). Without loss of generality let us assume that c1 > c2. Let the di⁄erence between the marginal
costs of ￿rms 1 and 2 be denoted by z; that is, z ￿ c1 ￿ c2: Subsequent to the merger of ￿rm 1 and
￿rm 2, the cost of production of the new entity is assumed to correspond to the lower of the two
marginal costs, that is c2: There, thus, exist cost savings from merger, denoted by z. Foreign also
has (n + 2) ￿rms each with a constant marginal cost given by cF: Each of the n + 2 foreign ￿rms
sells y in Home and y￿ in Foreign. Firm 1 sells x1 in Home and x￿
1 in Foreign. Firm 2 sells x2 in
Home and x￿
2 in Foreign. Each of the n identical Home ￿rms sells x in Home and x￿ in Foreign.
Firms compete in quantities, that is, ￿ la Cournot. The inverse demand in each country is given
by:
P(Y ) = a ￿ bY
where a;b > 0 and Y is the total quantity sold in the country.
Each country imposes an import tari⁄. It is assumed that the tari⁄s imposed by Foreign and
6Home are identical, denoted by t. We focus on the case where both countries simultaneously reduce
t by the same amount, that is, equal bilateral tari⁄ reduction. This re￿ ects the scenario where
countries sign a free trade agreement, such as NAFTA, subsequent to which the signatories must
phase out their tari⁄s over a period of several years.
The market equilibrium
Let the total quantity sold in Home be Q ￿ x1 + x2 + nx + (n + 2)y and that in Foreign be
Q￿ ￿ x￿
1 + x￿





xi(a ￿ bQ) ￿ cixi if i = 1;2
x(a ￿ bQ) ￿ cx; if i = 3;4;:::;n + 2
(1)







i(a ￿ bQ￿) ￿ (ci + t)x￿
i if i = 1;2
x￿(a ￿ bQ￿) ￿ (c + t)x￿; if i = 3;4;:::;n + 2
(2)
The pro￿ts of Foreign ￿rm f from its sales in Home are given by:
￿f ￿ y(a ￿ bQ) ￿ (cF + t)y; for f = 1;2;:::;n + 2 (3)
The pro￿ts of Foreign ￿rm f from its sales in Foreign are given by:
￿￿
f ￿ y￿(a ￿ bQ￿) ￿ cFy￿; for f = 1;2;:::;n + 2 (4)
Each Home ￿rm, i; takes the quantity chosen by the other (2n + 3) ￿rms as given and chooses the
quantities that maximize its pro￿ts as given by (1) and (2). Similarly, each Foreign ￿rm, f; takes
the quantity chosen by the other (2n + 3) ￿rms as given and chooses the quantities that maximize
its pro￿ts given by (3) and (4). Before proceeding with the analysis, the following simplifying
assumptions are made: c = c2 = cF = 0 and a = b = 1: This is done to avoid lengthening the
essay with the study of numerous possible cases that do not signi￿cantly add to the nature of the
7conclusions. For an interior equilibrium, the quantities sold in Home by the di⁄erent ￿rms are given
by:
^ x1 =
1 + (n + 2)t ￿ (2n + 4)z
(2n + 5)
^ x2 =
1 + z + (n + 2)t
(2n + 5)
^ x =
1 + z + (n + 2)t
(2n + 5)
^ y =
1 + z ￿ (n + 3)t
(2n + 5)
The equilibrium quantities sold in Foreign are given by:
^ x￿
1 =




1 + t + z + nt ￿ (2n + 4)t
(2n + 5)
^ x￿ =
1 + 2t + z ￿ (n + 5)t
(2n + 5)
^ y￿ =
1 + 2t + z + nt
(2n + 5)
It is straightforward to obtain the pro￿ts for each ￿rm at the equilibrium by substituting the quan-










; i = 1;2
A merger
A domestic merger of two ￿rms, ￿rms 1 and 2, in Home is examined. When these two ￿rms merge,
the new entity and the 2n+2 other ￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot. Recall that the cost of production
of the new entity is assumed to correspond to the lower of the two marginal costs resulting in cost
savings from merger, denoted by z. The subscript, M; denotes post-merger values throughout the
rest of the essay.
8Let XM and X￿
M denote the quantities sold by the merged entity in Home and Foreign respec-
tively. For interior solutions, the post-merger equilibrium quantities sold in Home are given by:
^ XM =
1 + (n + 2)t
(2n + 4)
^ xM =
1 + (n + 2)t
(2n + 4)
^ yM =
1 ￿ (n + 2)t
(2n + 4)
The total post-merger sales in Home is given by ^ QM ￿ ^ XM + n^ xM + (n + 2) ^ yM: The post-merger
equilibrium quantities sold in Foreign are given by:
^ X￿
M =








1 + (n + 1)t
(2n + 4)












Moreover, for notational convenience we de￿ne the following:
B ￿ 138n + 153n2 + 60n3 + 8n4 + 14 > 0 (5)
Although, for clarity, we focus on the case where both countries have an equal number of ￿rms,
the main results of this paper hold more generally for all combinations of the number of Home and
Foreign ￿rms such that B > 0:
2In a closed economy, under Cournot oligopoly, mergers are not always pro￿table. In fact, as shown by Salant,
Switzer and Reynolds (1983), a non-cost-reducing merger is only pro￿table if at least 80% of the industry participates
in the merger. The case studied in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) can be retrieved from the model at hand by
for example setting c1 = c2 = cF = c and either t = 0 or t at a prohibitive level such that no trade takes place.
9It is noted that, under these speci￿cations, the following conditions hold at equilibrium. It holds
that pre- and post-merger quantities in Home, ^ x1; ^ x2; ^ x; ^ y; ^ XM; ^ xM; and ^ yM are strictly positive
i⁄ t 2
￿










a ￿ 2z (n + 2)
n + 3
It holds that pre- and post-merger quantities in Foreign, ^ x￿
1; ^ x￿
2; ^ x￿; ^ y￿; ^ X￿
M; ^ x￿
M; and ^ y￿
M are strictly
positive i⁄ t 2 [0;tmax (z)): We further note that tmax (z) > tmin (z) i⁄ z < a
2(n+2):
3 Welfare E⁄ects of a Merger
One of the main objectives of this paper is to use the framework set up in the previous section
to determine whether trade liberalization makes mergers more or less desirable to society. In this
section, we take the ￿rst step towards this objective by de￿ning the concept of social desirability of
a merger. In our context, this is equivalent to determining the welfare implication in Home of the
merger between ￿rms 1 and 2. Social welfare, taken to be the sum of consumers￿surplus, producers￿
surplus and government revenue, denoted by CS; PS and TR respectively, is given by:
W = CS + TR + PS
Post-merger social welfare is denoted by:
WM = CSM + TRM + PSM
The change in welfare due to a merger is given by F ￿ WM ￿ W; that is:
F = (CSM ￿ CS) + (TRM ￿ TR) + (PSM ￿ PS) (6)
10The merger, thus, increases welfare if and only if F > 0.
Marginal trade liberalization is said to increase (decrease) the desirability of the merger (from









A non-marginal tari⁄ reduction from t1 to t0 is said to increase (decrease) the desirability of the
merger i⁄ Fjt=t0 > Fjt=t1 (Fjt=t0 < Fjt=t1).
Before proceeding to determine the impact of marginal and non-marginal trade liberalization on
the social desirability of mergers, it is useful to examine the components of F, as presented by (6),
using Lemmas 1 - 4 below. This enables us to explain the impact of trade liberalization on di⁄erent
groups within the society, such as consumers, ￿rms and the government, and thereby, to identify the
main (often counter-acting) forces driving the results presented in the following section.


















where QM represents the total post-merger sales in Home.
Lemma 1:
(i) For all t > tmin (z); it holds that the merger-induced change in consumers￿surplus, (CSM ￿CS);
is negative:
(ii) (CSM ￿ CS) is convex and monotonically decreasing in t for all t 2 [0;tmax (z)):
Proof:
(i) It can be shown that Q > QM i⁄t > tmin (z): Thus, it follows from (7) and (8) that (CSM￿CS) <
0 for all t > tmin (z):
11(ii) We have:
@2






















This shows that (CSM ￿CS) is strictly convex in t: It is also noted that @
@t(CSM ￿CS) < 0 for all
t 2 [0;tmax (z)): This proves that (CSM ￿CS) is monotonically decreasing in t for all non-prohibitive
tari⁄ levels. ￿
Lemma 1 states that consumers￿surplus falls after the merger due to the fall in total sales in Home.
This implies that for non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels, a reduction in the tari⁄ level results in the merger
being less harmful to consumers. The lower the tari⁄ level, the greater the volume of imports. This
implies a lower equilibrium price of the product in the Home market, which in turn reduces the
merger-induced loss in consumers￿surplus.
We now turn to the change in tari⁄revenue as a result of the merger. Pre-merger and post-merger
tari⁄ revenues at any given t are given by TR ￿ t(n + 2)y and TRM ￿ t(n + 2)yM respectively.
Lemma 2: The merger-induced change in tari⁄ revenue, (TRM ￿ TR); is positive, and is convex
and monotonically increasing in t for all t 2 [0;tmax (z)):
Proof: We have
@2




This shows that (TRM ￿ TR) is strictly convex in t. It also holds that
@ (TRM ￿ TR)
@t
jt=t￿ = 0
12where t￿ ￿ 4z￿a+2nz
2(n+2) : It is noted that t￿ < 0 for all z such that tmax (z) > 0: This, together
with (TRM ￿ TR)jt=0 = 0; ensures that for all non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels (TRM ￿ TR) > 0 and
@
@t (TRM ￿ TR) > 0. ￿
Lemma 2 can be explained as follows. At any given tari⁄ level, the joint Home sales of the merging
￿rms is shown to fall as a result of the merger. In a Cournot setting, this implies that all other ￿rms
serving the Home market, Home and Foreign ￿rms alike, increase their outputs. In other words,
imports rise. The increase in imports as a result of the merger is linear and increasing in t, IM ￿ I,
as shown below:
IM ￿ I =
a + (n + 2)t ￿ (2n + 4)z
2(2n + 5)
(9)
From (9), we have the unexpected result that in response to trade liberalization, the magnitude of
the merger-induced rise in imports decreases. This can be explained as follows. The higher the
tari⁄ level, the greater the market power enjoyed by the merging ￿rms in the Home market and the
greater the fall in their joint output after the merger. This in turn implies a greater reaction by
Foreign ￿rms in terms of a rise in the volume of their sales in the Home market. This explains why
the change in tari⁄ revenue due to merger increases in the tari⁄ level.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, it is possible to identify groups to whom the merger becomes more
desirable as trade is liberalized and others to whom the merger becomes less desirable.
Proposition 1: For all non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels, a tari⁄ reduction makes the merger less harmful
to consumers and less desirable to the customs agency.
Proof: The proof follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2. ￿
In Proposition 1, "customs agency" refers to that division of the government which is responsible
for collecting tari⁄ revenue. Subsequent to the merger, the tari⁄ revenue collected by the customs
13agency rises, as explained above. However, from Lemma 2 it follows that this gain in tari⁄ revenue
diminishes as the tari⁄ is reduced. This is explained by (9) which shows that as the tari⁄ is
reduced, the merger-induced change in imports diminishes in magnitude. This, in turn, causes
the merger-induced change in tari⁄ revenue that the customs agency collects to fall in the face of
trade liberalization. Thus, from the custom agency￿ s perspective, the merger becomes less desirable
in response to trade liberalization. On the other hand, consumers are less adversely a⁄ected by the
merger as a result of trade liberalization, as shown by Lemma 1.
Next we examine the e⁄ect of the merger on producers￿surplus, at any given tari⁄ level. Pre-
merger producers￿surplus is given by:
PS = (￿1 + ￿￿
1) + (￿2 + ￿￿
2) + n(￿ + ￿￿)
Post-merger producers￿surplus is given by:
PSM = (￿M + ￿￿
M) + n(￿M + ￿￿
M)
The merger participants can gain or lose from the merger, depending on the values of t and z:
This is because, in a Cournot oligopoly, the merger participants have to sacri￿ce some market share
in order to bring about the gain in market power subsequent to the merger.3 The non-participating
￿rms will gain from the merger, but it is unclear as to whether the merger will become more or less
desirable to them as trade is liberalized. The reason for this ambiguity is that unlike (CSM￿CS) and
(TRM ￿ TR), the expression for (PSM ￿PS) can be non-monotonic even for non-prohibitive tari⁄
levels. For all non-participating Home ￿rms, the merger-induced change in pro￿ts from Home sales is
increasing in the tari⁄ level (the "Home e⁄ect"), whereas the merger-induced change in pro￿ts from
Foreign sales is decreasing in the tari⁄ level for non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels (the "Foreign e⁄ect").
The reverse holds for the merger participants. At high tari⁄ levels, the volume of exports is low,
3This is illustrated by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983).
14so that the "Home e⁄ect" dominates. As the tari⁄ level is lowered, the volume of exports rises and
the "Foreign e⁄ect" becomes stronger and eventually outweighs the "Home e⁄ect". This causes the
non-monotonicity of (PSM ￿ PS) in t even for non-prohibitive tari⁄ levels:
Whether (PSM ￿PS) is concave or convex in t depends on the number of Home ￿rms to Foreign
￿rms. The change in producers￿surplus due to merger can be decomposed into the change in the
pro￿ts of the merging ￿rms and that of the non-participating ￿rms. The former has been shown to
be quadratic and concave in t in Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri (2006). The latter is shown to be
convex in t; as follows. The merger-induced change in joint pro￿ts of the n non-partcipating Home
￿rms, denoted ￿￿￿M is given by:
￿￿￿M ￿ n(￿M + ￿￿
M) ￿ n(￿ + ￿￿)
with
@2






























Essentially the merging ￿rms perform a "service" to the non-participating ￿rms by reducing
total quantity supplied in the market and raising price. The non-participating ￿rms free-ride on
this. When the number of Home ￿rms is less than the number of Foreign ￿rms, most of the free-
riders are foreign ￿rms.4 The greater is the number of Foreign ￿rms relative to the number of Home
￿rms, the smaller the magnitude of the domestic non-participating ￿rms relative to all other ￿rms
(including the domestic merging ￿rms). Thus, the greater is the merger-induced change in pro￿ts
of the merging ￿rms as a proportion of (PSM ￿ PS): This causes (PSM ￿ PS) to become concave
4For the linear demand case and for any given tari⁄ level, Dixit (1984) shows that for a domestic merger within
an open economy to be welfare-improving, imports as a proportion of total domestic sales must be less than 50%.
15in t if the number of Foreign ￿rms is su¢ ciently larger than the number of Home ￿rms: Lemma 3,
below, gives the case where Home and Foreign have an equal number of ￿rms.
Lemma 3: The merger-induced change in producers￿surplus, (PSM ￿ PS); is strictly concave in t
for t 2 [0;tmax (z)):
Proof: We have that (PSM ￿ PS) is quadratic in t: When Home and Foreign each have (n + 2)
￿rms; it holds that
@2
@t2(PSM ￿ PS) = ￿
(3n + 7)
￿
10n + 2n2 + 13
￿
2(2n + 5)
2 (n + 2)
2 < 0: ￿
In this section, by examining the separate components of F; we have identi￿ed groups within the
society which ￿nd the merger less desirable (the customs agency) and less undesirable (consumers)
in the face of trade liberalization. We have also discussed the merger-induced changes in the pro￿ts
of the merger participants and of the non-participants and distinguished between how each depends
on the tari⁄ level. Our next step is to evaluate the combined e⁄ect on these di⁄erent groups within
society. This leads us to the main question of interest of this paper: How does the social desirability
of merger vary as the tari⁄ level is reduced? In other words, we proceed to examine how F varies
in t: It is noted that F is a quadratic function of t: Whether F is concave or convex in t depends on
the rates of change of (PSM ￿PS) (which is concave in t) relative to (TRM ￿TR) and (CSM ￿CS)
(which are both convex in t) with respect to t:
Lemma 4: The merger-induced change in welfare, F; is strictly convex in t for t 2 [0;tmax (z)):
Proof: When Home and Foreign have (n + 2) ￿rms; computing the second derivative of F with





2 (n + 2)
2 > 0
16where B is given by (5). This implies that the merger-induced change in welfare, F; is quadratic
and strictly convex in t:￿
4 Trade liberalization and desirability of merger
Our ultimate objective in this paper is to determine whether the change in the desirability of merger
from the perspective of society and of the merger partricipants in response to trade liberalization are
aligned and thereby to infer the implications for merger policy within this context. Having identi￿ed,
in the previous section, the factors which a⁄ect the merger-induced change in welfare as the tari⁄ is
reduced, we are now in a position to address the ￿rst of these issues: Under what conditions does a
reduction in the tari⁄ level increase the desirability of the merger in question? We shall return to
the response of the pro￿tability of merger in the following section.
Marginal trade liberalization
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For any tari⁄ t > 0 and z > zw(0), marginal trade liberalization increases (decreases) the desirability
of a merger i⁄ t 2 [0;tw (z)) (i⁄ t > tw (z)):
Proof: It holds that @F
@t jt=tw(z) = 0. It holds that tw (z) > 0 i⁄ z > zw(0). This, together with
Lemma 4 completes the proof. ￿
17Proposition 2 shows that, given any z > zw(0); the e⁄ect of a marginal tari⁄ reduction on F is
dependent on the pre-liberalization tari⁄ level, t. By Lemma 4, it holds that F is convex in t:
Proposition 2 shows further that F is non-monotonic in t for z > zw(0): A marginal tari⁄ reduction
makes the merger more desirable only if the pre-liberalization tari⁄ level is su¢ ciently low. At
tari⁄ levels higher than the threshold tw (z); on the other hand, a marginal tari⁄ reduction has
the reverse e⁄ect on the desirability of merger. The direct policy implication of Proposition 2 is as
follows. The role of the competition bureau, is shown to depend on the pre-liberalization tari⁄level.
In the neighbourhood of free trade, a marginal tari⁄reduction increases the social desirability of the
merger, so that the competition bureau need not be concerned about the impact of marginal trade
liberalization. If the merger would have been allowed pre-liberalization, then it will necessarily
be allowed post-liberalization. However, at su¢ ciently higher tari⁄ levels, this does not hold. A
proposed merger that would have been welfare improving and therefore allowed pre-liberalization,
may become socially undesirable as a result of trade liberalization. Thus, at high tari⁄ levels the
competition bureau needs to be more vigilant with regard to its merger policy in response to trade
liberalization. It is interesting to note that tw (z) is increasing in z. Thus, for any z > 0; we have
tw (z) > tw (0): That is, as long as tw (0) > 0; we have that the non-monotonicity of F in t holds
for all positive levels of cost savings from merger and the ensuing policy implications, as discussed
above, become relevant.
The analysis in Proposition 2 can be used to give important new insights to the role of cost
savings from merger in determining the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the desirability of mergers.
In particular, for a given tari⁄ level, the impact of marginal trade liberalization crucially depends
on the level of cost savings, as illustrated by Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: For any tari⁄ t > 0 and z > 0, a marginal trade liberalization increases (decreases)
the desirability of a merger i⁄ z > zw(t) > 0 (i⁄ z 2 (0;zw(t))).
18Proof: Straightforward from the de￿nition of zw (t):
Corollary 1 shows that, at any given tari⁄ level, the e⁄ect of a marginal tari⁄ reduction on F is
dependent on the magnitude of the merger-induced cost savings, z: A marginal tari⁄reduction makes
the merger more desirable only if the cost savings are su¢ ciently high. If the merger entails low
cost savings, then a marginal tari⁄ reduction has the reverse e⁄ect. It is interesting to note that the
critical level of cost savings, beyond which marginal trade liberalization increases the desirability
of merger, zw(t); is increasing in t. Thus, for any t > 0; it holds that zw (t) > zw (0): At any
given tari⁄ level, Corollary 1 implies that the role of the competition bureau depends on the level of
cost savings from merger. At su¢ ciently low cost saving levels, a proposed merger that would have
been welfare improving and therefore allowed pre-liberalization, may become socially undesirable as
a result of trade liberalization. Therefore, the competition bureau needs to become more cautious
with regard to its merger policy in response to trade liberalization when the cost savings from merger
are low. However, at su¢ ciently high levels of cost savings, the competition bureau need not be
concerned about the impact of marginal trade liberalization. If the merger would have been allowed
pre-liberalization, then it will necessarily be allowed post-liberalization.
We proceed to identify a range of cost savings for which the e⁄ect of marginal trade liberalization
is independent of the tari⁄level. For z 2 [0;zw(0)), it holds that tw (z) < 0 and therefore, a marginal
trade liberalization decreases the desirability of a merger for all t > 0.
Trade liberalization: a global analysis
We now turn our attention to another interesting implication of Proposition 2. Since a marginal
analysis can lead to di⁄erent results at di⁄erent levels of tari⁄, a marginal analysis may not be a
reliable predictor of the e⁄ects of non-marginal tari⁄ reductions. For a merger with a given level
of cost savings, we seek to determine the conditions under which the impact of marginal and non-
19marginal trade liberalization will di⁄er.
Given cost savings from merger, z; if trade liberalization increases the desirability of merger in
the neighborhood of free trade, then, by Proposition 2, it will increase the desirability of the merger
for any pre-liberalization tari⁄ level, t0 such that t0 < tw (z): It can also be concluded that a non-
marginal change in tari⁄ from t = t0 < tw (z) to t = 0 will increase the desirability of a merger: that
is, for a given level of cost savings z, if t0 < tw (z) then F (t0;z) < F (0;z).
An interesting case arises when the pre-liberalization tari⁄ level is su¢ ciently large: t = t0 >
tw(z0): Given cost savings from merger z; it holds that @F
@t
￿ ￿
t=t0 > 0 and @F
@t
￿ ￿
t=0 < 0. The analysis
of a marginal tari⁄ reduction will cease to be a reliable predictor of the desirability of merger when
moving from protection to free trade. The conclusions around t = t0 and t = 0 give con￿ icting
recommendations on how to adjust competition policy following a move toward free trade.
Proposition 3: Let









t > 0 and yet F (0;z) > F (t;z):
Proof: The function F (t;z) ￿ F (0;z) is a convex quadratic function of t with roots at t = 0 and
t = ~ t(z): Therefore, for t 2 (0;~ t(z)) it holds that F (t;z) ￿ F (0;z) < 0 and for t > ~ t(z) it holds
that F (t;z) ￿ F (0;z) > 0. This, together with Proposition 2, concludes the proof.





at which marginal trade liberalization decreases the desirability of merger whereas a complete re-
moval of a tari⁄increases the desirability of merger. This brings us to one of the main conclusions of
this paper regarding merger policy under trade liberalization. Proposition 3 implies that in order to
derive accurate policy decisions, the competition bureau must take into consideration the exact pre-





; at which the merger is desirable, a jump to free trade necessitates that the
competition bureau allow the merger. If, however, the move to free trade is gradual, as is typically
the case subsequent to the signing of international trade treaties, it becomes relevant to investigate
the e⁄ect of reducing the tari⁄ level marginally. As illustrated by Proposition 3, this could lead to
the merger becoming undesirable in the period immediately following the free trade agreement. The
competition bureau would then need to compare the costs of allowing the merger in the short run
and the bene￿ts of allowing the merger in the longer run when the tari⁄ level eventually approaches
zero.
5 Pro￿tability and desirability of merger
We now combine the analysis of the desirability of a horizontal merger with the analysis of the
pro￿tability of such a merger to address the second important question of the essay: does trade
liberalization move the social and private responses to a potential merger in the same direction?
In order to determine the implications for competition policy, one must study the e⁄ect of trade
liberalization on the pro￿tability of the merger as well as the desirability of the merger. For example,
can trade liberalization increase the desirability of the merger but decrease its pro￿tability? In such
a case, instead of preventing a potential merger, competition policy might have to be designed to
actively encourage the merger. In this section, ranges of cost savings and tari⁄levels are identi￿ed for
which trade liberalization increases (or decreases) both the pro￿tability and desirability of merger,
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(i) For z 2 [0;z￿
w) and t 2 (maxf0;tw (z)g;t￿ (z)); a marginal tari⁄ reduction decreases both the
pro￿tability and the desirability of the merger.
(ii) For z > z￿
w and t 2 (maxf0;t￿ (z)g;tw (z)); a marginal tari⁄ reduction increases both the
pro￿tability and the desirability of the merger.
Proof: Marginal trade liberalization increases (decreases) the pro￿tability of a merger i⁄ t > t￿ (z)
(t < t￿ (z)) (See Corollary 1 of Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri (2006)). It can be shown that
tw(z￿
w)￿t￿ (z￿
w) = 0, with tw(z)￿t￿ (z) linear and increasing in z: Thus, for z 2 [0;z￿
w); it holds that
tw(z) < t￿ (z) and for z > z￿
w; it holds that tw(z) > t￿ (z): It holds that t￿ (z) > 0 i⁄ z < z￿ (0);
where z￿ (t) = t￿￿1 (z); and tw (z) > 0 i⁄ z < zw (0): Since zw (0) < z￿
w < z￿ (0); it holds that
t￿ (z) > 0 for z 2 [0;z￿
w) and tw (z) > 0 for z > z￿
w: This, together with Proposition 2, concludes the
proof. ￿
Proposition 4 shows that given values of pre-liberalization tari⁄ levels lying between tw (z) and
t￿ (z); the need for competition policy to actively disallow or encourage the merger in response to
trade liberalization is reduced. If trade liberalization renders the merger more desirable, the merger
is naturally more likely to be realized since it simultaneously becomes more pro￿table. If trade
liberalization renders the merger less desirable, the merger is naturally less likely to be realized since
it simultaneously becomes less pro￿table.
There do arise cases, for extreme values of pre-liberalization tari⁄levels, for which the desirability
and pro￿tability of the merger move in opposite directions as trade is liberalized.
Proposition 5:
22(i) For z < z￿ (0) and t 2 [0;minft￿ (z);tw (z)g); trade liberalization increases the desirability and
decreases the pro￿tability of the merger.
(ii) For t > maxftw (z);t￿ (z)g; trade liberalization decreases the desirability and increases the prof-
itability of the merger.
Proof: We have t￿ (z) > 0 i⁄ z < z￿ (0): The proof follows directly from the de￿nitions of t￿ (z)
and tw (z); and Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 shows that, given su¢ ciently low levels of cost savings from merger, there does exist a
range of pre-liberalization tari⁄s, t 2 [0; minft￿ (z); tw (z)g); for which trade liberalization increases
the desirability of merger but reduces its pro￿tability, so that competition policy might be needed
to actively encourage the merger. For tari⁄ levels higher than maxftw (z);t￿ (z)g; on the other
hand, the need for competition policy to actively prevent the potential merger in the face of trade
liberalization increases. Although the merger becomes more pro￿table to the merger participants,
and therefore, is more likely to be realized, it becomes less desirable to society.
The analysis in Propositions 4-5 illustrates the conditions under which increased desirability
necessarily implies increased pro￿tability and vice versa, for a merger with a given level of cost-
savings. The level of cost savings, in reality, is di¢ cult to ascertain. Moreover, the potential cost
savings from a proposed merger are even harder for the competition bureau to measure. Therefore,
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23(i) For t 2 (t￿
w;t2); the following holds: If trade liberalization increases the desirability of merger
then it necessarily increases its pro￿tability. If trade liberalization decreases the pro￿tability of merger
then it necessarily decreases its desirability.
(ii) For t 2 [0;t￿
w); the following holds: If trade liberalization increases the pro￿tability of merger
then it necessarily increases its desirability. If trade liberalization decreases the desirability of merger
then it necessarily decreases its pro￿tability.
Proof:
(i) If trade liberalization increases the desirability of merger then, from Corollary 1, it follows that
z > zw (t): It can be shown that zw(t￿
w) ￿ z￿ (t￿
w) = 0 for m = n + 2, with zw(t) ￿ z￿ (t) linear
and increasing in t: Thus, for t 2 [0;t￿
w); it holds that zw(t) < z￿ (t) and for t > t￿
w; it holds
that zw(t) > z￿ (t): By de￿nition of z￿ (t); for z > zw (t) > z￿ (t) it follows that marginal trade
liberalization increases the pro￿tability of merger. On the other hand, if trade liberalization decreases
the pro￿tability of merger then, from Proposition 1 it follows that z < z￿ (t): Since zw(t) > z￿ (t);
and by de￿nition of zw(t); it follows that, for z < z￿ (t) < zw(t); marginal trade liberalization
decreases the desirability of the merger. Moreover, for t 2 (0;t2) (t > t2) it holds that z￿ (t) > 0
(z￿ (t) < 0):5 It is straightforward to show that t2 > t￿
w for m;n > 0:
(ii) Similar to proof of (i). ￿
Proposition 6(i) shows that, regardless of the cost savings from merger, when the tari⁄ level lies
within the range t 2 (t￿
w;t2); the need for competition policy to actively encourage the merger
in the face of trade of liberalization is reduced even when trade liberalization makes the merger
more desirable. If the merger becomes more desirable, it is naturally more likely to be realized.
Proposition 6(ii) shows that, regardless of the cost savings from the merger, when the tari⁄ level
lies within the range t 2 (0;t￿
w); the need for competition policy to actively disallow the merger in
5See Proposition 2, Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri (2006).
24the face of trade of liberalization is reduced even when trade liberalization makes the merger less
desirable. This is because the merger is naturally less likely to be realized.
6 Conclusion
In this paper the e⁄ects of bilateral tari⁄ reductions on cost-reducing horizontal domestic mergers
were analyzed. A two-country framework was used, where ￿rms engaged in Cournot competition.
It was shown that, in the neighborhood of free trade, marginal trade liberalization increases the
desirability of merger, whereas the reverse holds at su¢ ciently high tari⁄levels. In the neighborhoods
of free trade and the prohibitive tari⁄, for su¢ ciently low cost savings from merger, desirability and
pro￿tability of merger were shown to move in opposite directions in response to trade liberalization,
whereas for intermediate levels of tari⁄ it was shown that they move in the same direction. We
further showed that in the neighborhood of free trade, for su¢ ciently low cost savings from merger,
trade liberalization increases the desirability of merger whilst decreasing the pro￿tability. Thus,
a scenario was illustrated where competition policy might be called upon to actively encourage
domestic mergers rather than preventing them, in response to trade liberalization.
Previous studies have restricted their analyses to either the neighborhood of free trade or of
the optimal tari⁄ level. Since trade liberalization following free trade agreements often occurs as
piecemeal tari⁄ reductions, starting form a strictly positive initial tari⁄, we presented a global
analysis for all positive tari⁄ levels. Moreover, it was shown that for a given level of cost savings,
the impact of marginal trade liberalization on the desirability of merger can fail to be a reliable
indicator of the same when tari⁄ changes are non-marginal.
Regardless of the level of cost savings, it was shown that at su¢ ciently high tari⁄ levels, if trade
liberalization increases the desirability of a given merger then it necessarily increases its pro￿tability,
whilst at tari⁄ levels below a certain threshold, if desirability falls so must pro￿tability. Thus, at
25su¢ ciently high tari⁄ levels, if the merger becomes more desirable, it is naturally more likely to be
realized, whilst in the neighborhood of free trade, if the merger becomes less desirable, it is naturally
less likely to be realized.
Our results were obtained for the case where two domestic ￿rms merge, and given that all
bilateral tari⁄ reductions are equal for the two countries. It would be interesting to consider the
cases of cross-border mergers and unilateral tari⁄ reductions.
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